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JOHNSTOWN CO. v. DISHONG
if the victim dies, and the charge is murder, it is said, ex-
cept in the Woolmington28 case, that the homicide is pre-
sumed to have been committed with malice aforethought.
It would seem that the fact that the victim lives in one case,
and dies in another, is not a proper factual difference upon
which to base two different propositions of law. This is
particularly true when it is realized that the death of the
victim is not properly an element of culpable homicide as
evidenced by the decisions on jurisdictional questions hold-
ing that the state in which the blow was struck, regardless
of where the death occurred, has jurisdiction to try the de-
fendant.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
DECISION OF STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
COMMISSION BASED ON FINDING OF FACT
BY MEDICAL BOARD RELATING TO
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
Johnstown Coal & Coke Co. v. Dishong'
Dishong v. Davis Coal & Coke Co.
By MARK D. COPLIN*
Claimant Dishong, worked in Davis' mines for 28 years
as a coal loader, motor brakeman, and motorman. He left
Davis in 1945 and started work for Johnstown as a coal
loader, but in 1947 he noticed shortness of breath and pains
in his chest and was forced to quit in June, 1949, because of
difficulty in breathing. In May, 1950, claimant learned for
the first time that he had silicosis, whereupon he filed a
claim for compensation against both former employers. It
was shown before the Medical Board that claimant came in
contact with coal and sand dust while working for Davis,
and that while in the employ of Johnstown he came in
contact with sand dust only a few minutes each day when
he passed along the haulage way. The Medical Board found
the claimant had contracted silicosis while working for
Davis, but that it was possible that further developments
of the disease may have occurred as a result of his exposure
28 Supra, n. 25.
184 A. 2d 847 (Md., 1951). Reh. den. Jan. 8, 1952.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B., 1949, University of Maryland; LL.B.,
1952, University of Maryland.
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to sand dust while working for Johnstown. The Commis-
sion dismissed the claim against Davis2 and ordered Johns-
town to pay compensation, whereupon Johnstown appealed
to the Circuit Court for Garrett County and, following an
adverse ruling, to the Court of Appeals. Held, affirming the
Commission, that the finding by the Medical Board that
claimant was injuriously exposed to sand dust while em-
ployed by Johnstown, "supported by inferences which may
be fairly drawn from the evidence," is final and not subject
to judicial review.
The Legislature has provided for administrative finality
of findings of fact by the State Industrial Accident Com-
mission in cases involving an occupational disease,' insofar
as is possible. In view of the clear legislative intent, it is
important to note the limitations, if any, upon this ad-
ministrative finality, and whether in any case the court
may upset the Commission's determination in an occupa-
2 Md. Code (1947 Supp.), Art. 101, Sec. 23, provided that an employer
should not be liable for any compensation for silicosis or asbestosis unless
disablement or death resulted "within three (3) years . . . after the last
injurious exposure to such disease in such employment... This time was
extended to five years by Md. Laws, 1951, Ch. 290; Md. Code (1951), Art.
101, Sec. 22(d), which might have preserved the claim for compensation
against Davis, but for the fact that the claim was disposed of prior to June
1, 1951, the effective date of the statute. Since claimant was not disabled
until more than four years after leaving Davis' employ, his claim against
Davis was barred by the three year statute of limitations.
However, Davis' liability would have been eliminated in any event by that
part of Art. 101, Sec. 23, supra, which limits liability in the case of silicosis
or asbestosis to "the last employer In whose employment the employee was
last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease during a period of
sixty (60) days or more. . . ." This provision is substantially reenacted by
Md. Laws, 1951, Ch. 290; Md. Code (1951), Art. 101, Sec. 22(b). Only if
it were found that claimant had not been "injuriously exposed" while em-
ployed by Johnstown could claimant recover from Davis, and it was appar-
ently to meet this eventuality that claimant joined Davis in this appeal.
S "In any hearing held by the State Industrial Accident Commission to
determine any controversial question in any case involving an occupa-
tional disease, no finding of fact by the Commission shall be subject to
be reviewed or set aside, reversed or modified; but the findings of fact
by the Commission shall be final and not subject to review or modifica-
tion by the Court or be submitted to a jury."
Johnstown Coal & Coke Co. v. Dishong, supra, n. 1, 849; Md. Code (1951),
Art. 101, Sec. 28, 57. Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Bishop,
189 Md. 147, 154, 55 A. 2d 507 (1947), says that "finality, in so far as the
legislature can make final the decision of an administrative tribunal, at-
taches to the decision of the Commission, (but) not to the decision of the
Medical Board." See also Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porter, 192 Md. 494, 64
A. 2d 715 (1949) ; Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Roland, 79 A. 2d 153 (1951).
Md. Code (1951), Art. 95A, Sec. 6(h), provides a somewhat similar rule
regarding findings of fact by the Unemployment Compensation Board which,
if supported by evidence, in the absence of fraud, are conclusive on the
court. See Steamship Association v. Maryland Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board, 190 Md. 215, 57 A. 2d 818 (1948) ; Brown v. Md. Unemp. Comp.
Board, 189 Md. 233, 55 A. 2d 696 (1947) ; Tucker v. American Smelting &
Refining Co., 189 Md. 250, 252, 55 A. 2d 692 (1947).
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tional disease proceeding. Although the Commission was
affirmed in the instant case, the Court of Appeals ad-
monished that the statute in question
"... cannot override the basic principle that the
Legislature cannot divest the courts of their inherent
power to review the actions of administrative agencies
which are illegal, arbitrary, or unreasonable and which
impair personal or property rights. There is an implied
limitation upon the authority of the State Industrial
Accident Commission that its findings shall be sup-
ported by legally sufficient evidence, for a finding un-
supported by any evidence is beyond the power of an
administrative agency as a denial of due process of
law. Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379, 380, 45 A. 2d 73.
"... The decision of the Commission, under the
authority conferred upon it by statute in cases in-
volving occupational diseases, is conclusive in the field
of inferences from evidentiary facts, unless it appears
that there is no reasonable basis for its conclusions and
therefore the decision exceeds its power.
"... this Court has no authority to set aside an
award of the Commission merely because the Court
might weigh or appraise the evidence differently.
Where the findings of the Commission are supported by
inferences which may be fairly drawn from the evi-
dence, even though the evidence may be susceptible of
opposing inferences, the Court will not reject those
findings. '4
It thus appears that at least in occupational disease cases,
a finding of fact by the Commission, supported by "legally
sufficient" evidence, or by reasonable "inferences from
evidentiary facts" may not be reviewed by the courts.
There seems to be no requirement that evidence be "sub-
stantial," as is so often stated in the cases, and the Com-
mission's finding apparently carries at least the weight of a
jury verdict, if not more.5
'1Supra, n. 1, 850, 851.
5 The Maryland rule In at least this phase of administrative law probably
differs from and is less liberal toward judicial review than the rule appli-
cable to most federal agencies under their respective statutes and the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act, Sec. 10(e), 5 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1009(e),
which requires that agency action be supported by "substantial evidence".
Thus, in O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U. S. 504, 508 (1951), it was
held that findings of the deputy commissioner under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act were subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act which, under the interpretation of Universal Camera Corp.
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Findings in an occupational disease case have reached
the Court of Appeals in a somewhat similar, if less ex-
treme case than that now under discussion. In Bethlehem-
Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Bishop,6 the Medical
Board found from evidence that the employee did not die
as a result of occupational disease, but from coronary
thrombosis brought on by arteriosclerosis. Two physi-
cians testified that decedent, who had been exposed to
lead fumes while on the job, probably died as a result of
lead poisoning. The Commission reversed the Medical
Board and granted an award. On appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, stating that there was substantial evidence
to support the finding of the Commission, and that the
statutory finality7 does not attach to the decision of the
Medical Board. The court's language in the instant case
indicates that the Commission's finding of death by lead
poisoning would have been sustained even if the evidence
were not so "substantial."
Support for this approach is found in numerous state
compensation cases, some of which are relied upon by the
Maryland court in the instant decision. In Van Domelon
v. Town of Vanden Broeck,s claimant was employed in
Wisconsin to drive a team and help remove snow from a
town road. The town "pathmaster" was present when
claimant had a heart attack, and knew that claimant had
quit work; and he even stayed with claimant for two weeks
during his illness. The town treasurer and supervisor knew
that claimant had taken ill while working on the road, and
the town chairman knew that claimant was sick, but not
that he had become ill on the job until two months later.
The Wisconsin Commission denied an award because claim-
ant had not given notice of injury within 30 days as re-
quired by statute, although the town knew through its
officers within the statutory period that claimant was dis-
abled. The Commission was affirmed on the ground that
knowledge of claimant's disability was not knowledge of
the occurrence of a compensable injury, and the court stated
that:
v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474 (1951), requires that "findings are to be
accepted unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole. (Emphasis supplied.) The Maryland court in the
instant case does not lay down such a broad evidential requirement. That
compensation commission's finding is entitled to the weight of a jury verdict,
see Hunter v. American Steel & Wire Co., 293 Pa. 103, 141 A. 635, 636 (1928).
0 Supra, n. 3.
TIbid, 154.
8 212 Wis. 22, 249 N. W. 60, 92 A. L. R. 501 (1933).
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"... in the field of inferences from evidentiary facts
the Commission's action is final and controlling under
the authority conferred upon it by law, unless it ap-
pears that there is no reasonable basis for its conclu-
sions under the facts and circumstances before it, and
that therefore its action is without or in excess of its
powers."9
In Harvey Coal Corp. v. Pappas, a claimant, who had
been in perfect health, was injured in a mine by falling
slate, and shortly thereafter his eyesight became seriously
affected and in a few months he was totally blind. An
award by the Kentucky Commission was upheld, although
seven or eight physicians testified that the injury could not
have caused the blindness because claimant had an ad-
vanced optic atrophy so shortly after the accident, and only
two or three physicians testified that the injury could and
probably did cause the blindness." As the opinion reasons,
... the question before this court is, not whether
the award is sustained by the evidence, but rather
whether there was any evidence tending to support
the award. This court will not consider the question
whether the findings of the board are palpably or
flagrantly against the evidence. We will only deter-
mine that there is evidence to support the findings, or
that there is not any evidence to support the findings.
It is not our province to weigh the evidence in such
cases.
"It makes no difference how much the evidence may
preponderate against the claimant so far as the courts
are concerned, if the Compensation Board made an
award on the claimant's evidence. The finding of facts
by the Workmen's Compensation Board is conclusive,
where there is any evidence to support the finding.
The evidence must amount to something of relevant
consequence, and it must not consist of mere vague, un-
certain, or irrelevant matter, not carrying the quality
of proof or having fitness to induce conviction.
"When the claimant produces evidence which would
authorize the Compensation Board to make an award,
if no other evidence was introduced, courts are not
9 Ibid, 62, 504.10230 Ky. 108, 18 S. W. 2d 958, 73 A. L. R. 473 (1929).
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authorized to set aside that award, however much
the evidence introduced by the employer may prepon-
derate against the claimant. .... 11
In Harford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ac-
cident Commission of California,2 claimant, a newspaper
carrier, arranged with a milk truck driver to carry him and
his papers over the route in return for assistance to the
driver. One morning, before completing his deliveries, the
newsboy reached for a bottle of milk for the driver, slipped,
and fell beneath the wheels of the truck and was injured.
The Commission made an award against the newspaper
company, although the accident occurred on a street which
was on the milk route and not on the paper route, and the
newspaper argued that claimant was not acting within the
scope of his employment when injured. The California
court stated:
".... this court will not annul an award of the Com-
mission where there is substantial evidence to support
the Commission's finding and order. ... And if the
findings are supported by inferences which may fairly
be drawn from the evidence, even though the evidence
be susceptible of opposing inferences the reviewing
court will not disturb the award.""
Whether "any" evidence 4 will suffice, or whether evi-
dence must be "legally sufficient,"" as in the instant case,
in order to satisfy the minimum requirement that the Com-
mission's finding be supported by evidence 6 is not always
clear; but it seems that courts using the former terminology
must certainly intend to include the latter by implication.
Perhaps a simpler way of expressing the rule is that in
Ibid, 959, 474-5.
202 Cal. 688, 262 P. 309, 58 A. L. R. 1392 (1927).
I8 lbid, 310, 1395.
,Supra, n. 11; Wisconsin Labor R. Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Co.,
228 Wis. 473, 279 N. W. 673, 682 (1938).
15Supra, n. 1, 850; Foster v. Goodpaster, 290 Ky. 410, 161 S. W. 2d( 626,
140 A. L. R. 1044 (1942).
18This would seem to meet the constitutional requirements of due process,
assuming due notice and proper opportunity to be heard. Supra, n. 1, 850;
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 47; Thomas v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 162
Md. 509, 514-515, 160 A. 793 (1932). However, in cases involving the impair-
ment of property rights such as by action of a zoning board, the courts may
guard more jealously their right to review administrative action in order to
determine whether the board acted on 8ubstantial evidence, or was guilty
of an arbitrary or unlawful exercise of discretion. See Heath v. Mayor and
C. C. of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 304, 49 A. 2d 799 (1946) ; Heaps v. Cobb,
185 Md. 372, 379, 45 A. 2d 73 (1945).
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cases involving occupational disease, the reviewing court
is precluded from examining questions of fact, but may
only rule on questions of law, such as whether the evidence
before the Commission was legally sufficient to support
its decision.17
In the instant case, there was evidence only of "mini-
mal""' exposure of claimant to sand dust while in Johns-
town's employ, where claimant came in contact with sand
dust "for a few minutes as he passed along the haulage way
to and from work" for four years and three months. This
is contrasted with the 28 years claimant spent in Davis'
mines, during which the Medical Board found he had first
contracted the disease. The Board said, however, that ex-
posure of claimant while working for Johnstown "could
not be said to be non-existent," and this was sufficient evi-
dence to support the award.
The rationale behind giving finality to the acts of ad-
ministrative agencies which are specially created to ad-
minister particular legislative programs is, of course, that
such agencies are best equipped to deal with the problems
delegated to them. Conversely, the courts generally are
not as well suited to the expeditious handling of an ad-
ministrative program, such as Workmen's Compensation,
and therefore they should not ordinarily be allowed to sub-
stitute their judgment for that of the agency, except as to
questions of law which are within the peculiar province of
the courts. 9
Such reasoning applies with particular force in cases
involving occupational disease where the Commission is
17 Supra, n. 1, 850, that sufficiency of evidence is a question of law. The
court may always review questions of law. Thus, where the Commission
granted an award in an occupational disease case without finding affirma-
tively, as required by Md. Code (1951), Art. 101, Sec. 22(c), that the con-
dition complained of was "characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occu-
pation, process, or employment, etc.," the commission was reversed on
grounds that it had "either misconstrued the legal effect of Section 23, or
made a finding that had no substantial evidence to support it." Kelly-
Springfield Tire Co. v. Roland, 79 A. 2d 153, 157 (1951). And where there
was no evidence that claimant sustained permanent disability from silicosis
within the statutory three year period of limitations after his last injurious
exposure (Md. Code (1947 Supp.), Art. 101, Sec. 23), but the commission
found that the employer knew of claimant's silicotic condition when it first
arose within the three year period and was therefore estopped by its failure
to tell him that he was suffering with silicosis, it was held that the finding
"is based upon an erroneous conception of law, and is clearly reviewable."
Gower v. Davis Coal & Coke Co., 78 A. 2d 195, 199 (1951). Sec. 23 referred
to above is now Sec. 22 in the 1951 Code.
ISupra, n. 1, 850.
1See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law in Maryland, 2 Md. L. Rev. 185
(1938), 208, and particularly at 209.
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aided by the findings of the Medical Board, which is com-
posed of medical experts," although it is true that Medical
Board findings are not binding on the Commission. How-
ever, even in cases not heard by the Board, or where the
Board is reversed, it is apparent that effective investigation,
adjudication and settlement of industrial accident claims
requires that the Commission's actions be final insofar as
is possible.2' The instant decision supports this policy.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON CHANGE OF
VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES
Heslop v. State'
The appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County of assault with intent to rob and
assault and battery. The indictment also charged three
other offenses for which he was acquitted. None of the
five offenses2 charged carried a possible capital sentence,
but at least the former one3 of the two for which he was
convicted carried a possible sentence to the State Peni-
tentiary. Prior to being tried he filed a request for re-
moval of his trial to another county, relying on the statute
of 1952,' which had amended the relevant Code Section 5
Supra, n. 1, 850.
"The object of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to furnish a
prompt, continuous and expert method for dealing with a class of ques-
tions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determina-
tion by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task."
Supra, n. 1, 850; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 46 (1932).
It should be observed, however, that the same statutory rule of adminis-
trative finality does not apply to findings of the Maryland Commission in
cases involving an accidental personal injury as distinguished from an
occupational disease. "The statutory burden of proof that the commission's
decision was incorrect is a burden of persuasion, which may be sustained
by satisfying the jury from the same evidence on which the commission
made its decision." Paul Const. Co. v. Powell, 88 A. 2d 837, 845 (Md., 1952).
"Whatever incongruity there may be in review by a jury of the presump-
tively correct decision of an administrative body supposed to be 'informed
by experience', only the legislature can correct. Apparently only in Mary-
land, Ohio, Oregon, and Oklahoma are such administrative decisions re-
viewable by a jury.. . ." Ibid.
295 A. 2d 880 (Md., 1953).
Robbery, assault with intent to rob, assault and battery, larceny and re-
ceiving stolen goods. Ibid, 880.
Assault with intent to rob.
'Md. Laws 1952, Ch. 69.
Md. Code (1951), Art. 75, Sec. 109.
